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TH E U K ’ s CLI M A T E C HAN G E L E VY :
IS IT W O R K I N G ?
Benjamin J. Richardson* and Kiri L. Chanwai†

1. Introduction
Is the UK government’s Climate Change Levy (CCL) inﬂuencing British companies
to become more energy efﬁcient and to use clean renewable energy sources? This
Article reviews brieﬂy the arguments for using energy taxes in environmental policy.
It explains the structure and operation of the CCL designed to reduce consumption
of fossil fuels. The Article examines the CCL’s implementation and considers the
results of several empirical studies including a survey undertaken by Chanwai of the
response of businesses in the Northwest of England. Finally, the Article proposes ways
to redesign the CCL to enable it to more effectively support environmental goals.
In recent years, energy activities have surfaced from the relative backwaters of UK
environmental regulation to occupy a central policy-making concern. The reason is
climate change. As the scientiﬁc prognosis of global warming has ﬁrmed, and
evidence of the likely economic and ecological ramiﬁcations become better
understood, authorities in the UK and abroad have sought new instruments to
control rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main
culprit, accounting for over three-quarters of Britain’s relevant emissions.1 The
government’s Climate Change Programme launched in November 20002 and
coordinated by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA), sketches how the UK intends to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitment of
a 12.5% reduction on 1990 levels of all GHGs by 2012, and achievement of the
separate domestic goal of a 20% cut in CO2 emissions below 1990 levels by 2010.
Electricity generation is a major source of GHG emissions. The UK’s electricity

consumption jumped by 16% from 1990 to 1999, although actual CO2 emissions
declined because of the ‘dash for gas’ and improved performance of nuclear
generation.3 The switch to gas, however, was a fortuitous event, and the
government has conceded: ‘the UK’s energy sector is still largely reliant on fossil
fuels and, unless they can be replaced by plants with low or no emissions, this
dependence will increase after 2010 as existing nuclear power stations reach the
end of their licensed lifetimes’.4 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
(RCEP) has advised that CO2 reductions of 60% by 2050 are necessary if Britain is to
avoid dangerous climate change.5 The Kyoto targets simply reﬂect what was
politically feasible at the time and not what is appropriate from an ecological
standpoint.6
The thrust of the government’s plan to promote energy efﬁciency and expand the
role of renewables is to change corporate behaviour through economic instruments.7
The key policy tools are the CCL, a Carbon Emissions Trading System (CETS), and
a structure for trading in renewable energy supply obligations. The CETS is an
experimental, voluntary regime and, like the tradeable ‘Renewables Obligations’,
only very recently came into effect, making analysis somewhat premature at this
stage. So far, the CCL is the government’s primary weapon for tackling fossil fuel
emissions. The Levy focuses on the industry sector, although it accounts for a minority
of Britain’s GHG emissions: transport is the biggest scourge, accounting for some
34% of ﬁnal energy use, followed by households (29%) industry and services (23%)
and agriculture (14%).8 The growing dependence on economic instruments as a
means of energy policy is based on a number of assumptions about the effectiveness
of such instruments.

2. Environmental Taxation
2.1 Development of Eco-Taxes
In many jurisdictions, including the UK, economic instruments have become an
increasingly fashionable environmental policy tool.9 During the 1990s several

European Union (EU) states, particularly in Scandinavia, introduced carbon and
energy taxes to control GHG emissions,10 although the European Commission’s
proposal for a EU-wide tax failed to garner sufﬁcient support, primarily because of
international trade competition concerns given the absence of such a tax in the
United States.11 Although ‘eco-tax’ proposals in the mid-1990s were grounded in
Australia12 and the United States,13 recently some governments have become more
tolerant of environmental taxation, such as New Zealand, which in April 2002
announced plans for a new carbon charge.14 Nonetheless, eco-taxation remains
often controversial; for instance, in December 2000 the French Constitutional
Court nulliﬁed the government’s extension of the pollution tax to consumption of
fossil fuels and electricity.15 Two decades of market deregulation in the West has
left energy and environmental taxes in many countries at levels relatively lower
than they were 20 years ago.16
Although the UK has been wedded to planning controls and licensing for managing
environmental pressure, as early as 1992 the government proclaimed, ‘in future there
will be a general presumption in favour of economic instruments’.17 Subsequently,
the government introduced the landﬁll tax (1996) and amended company car
taxation (2000), but abandoned plans for a pesticides tax.18 The 1999 Sustainable
Development Strategy promised: ‘the Government will explore the scope for
using economic instruments, such as taxes and charges, to deliver more sustainable
development. Such measures can promote change, innovation and efﬁciency, and
higher environmental standards’.19 The Treasury’s 1997 Statement of Intent on
Environmental Taxation posited key principles for the design of taxation reforms,
beginning with that ‘polluters should face the true costs which their actions impose
on society’. However, the government’s rhapsody for economic instruments has been
tempered by the realisation that market tools can have unwelcome social and
economic side-effects. The Treasury’s Statement acknowledged that the polluter
pays principle should be subject to several qualiﬁcations, including, that: ‘the social
consequences of environmental taxation must be acceptable’; and ‘environmental

policies must not threaten the competitiveness of UK business’.
The genesis of the CCL can be found in academic and policy studies dating from
the 1960s. There exists a plethora of literature on the potential of taxes (and other
economic instruments) to contribute to more efﬁcient and more effective
environmental policy.20 Compared to traditional command regulation involving
technology or emissions licensing standards, eco-taxes and tradeable emission
allowances may enable society to achieve a given environmental outcome at a
lower economic cost, or achieve a superior environmental outcome at the same
cost.21 Interest in economic approaches to environmental regulation arose among
academic circles in the 1960s, inﬂuenced by the pioneering theories of Pigou and
Coase.22 In the 1970s, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) advanced the concept of the ‘polluter pays’ principle (PPP) as a basis for
removing hidden subsidies that gave an unfair competitive advantage to polluting
industries.23 In the 1980s and 1990s, under the inﬂuence of the sustainable
development discourse, the PPP was repackaged into the more broad-based
‘internationalisation of environmental costs’ principle.24 The EU Treaty was
amended to provide that ‘the polluter should pay’ principle be a basis of
Community policy on the environment.25
A number of Scandinavian and other European countries have adopted energy
taxes (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden).26
These have often taken the form of extended systems of fuel excises in which rates
of tax are deﬁned for each fuel with regard to fuel quantity and approximation of
carbon content (see Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and Denmark).
Further, the level of tax can vary according to the type of energy user; in Sweden
and the Netherlands, much lower rates of tax apply to industrial energy users
than to electricity consumed by private households. Although the highest taxes
have been adopted by Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, some existing energy taxes
were reduced at the time of the new taxes and all three countries offer
substantial tax relief to industry. On the other hand, the smaller energy taxes

imposed by Finland and the Netherlands make fewer concessions to industry.
Signiﬁcantly, none of the above ﬁve countries has signiﬁcant domestic coal
production, and several derive most of their electricity from hydropower.
Consequently, international competitiveness concerns would not have weighed as
heavily in these countries as they have in Australia or the United States.27
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Eco-Taxes
From the standpoint of environmental policy, eco-taxes may be attractive for several
reasons.28 Firstly, eco-taxes can promote efﬁciency gains through reallocation of
pollution (e.g. carbon) abatement costs and through performance incentives. The
costs of pollution reduction typically vary among ﬁrms (known as different ‘marginal
costs of abatement’), and efﬁcient businesses should seek to lower their tax
burden by investing in clean production technologies where this is most cost
effective.29 Other policy instruments such as pollution licenses cannot be readily
tailored to reﬂect each polluter’s abatement or energy management costs.30
Secondly, eco-taxes provide innovation incentives; they can give polluters an
ongoing incentive to seek more efﬁcient ways (e.g. technological innovations or
recycling) to reduce emissions or save energy, whereas there is little ﬁnancial
incentive to do better once prescribed environmental standards are met.31 Thirdly,
eco-taxes should be less vulnerable to regulatory capture compared to command
regulation; where regulators attempt to set differentiated company-by-company
targets they must acquire the necessary information about each ﬁrm’s abatement or
technology characteristics, which creates a risk for regulators of getting drawn into
negotiations and the making of concessions to industry as a price for their
cooperation.32 Eco-taxes can take account of all businesses’ differing pollution
abatement costs without the need to consider the particular circumstances of
individual ﬁrms. Fourthly, eco-taxes can also generate substantial revenues that
can be recycled for environmental improvement investments. However, the revenue
of an eco-tax is coincidental, and should decrease where a tax is ‘ecologically
optimal’.33

Apart from the environmental beneﬁts, eco-taxes may yield economic and political
advantages. When eco-taxes are introduced as part of systematic revision of a nation’s
tax system, with corresponding reductions in income and employment taxes—known
in the literature as ‘ecological tax reform’—there may also arise the beneﬁts of jobs
growth and economic investment (the ‘double dividend’ hypothesis).34 Secondly, it has
been argued that using taxes and other economic instruments has democratic
beneﬁts in that enables the public to focus on the fundamental questions of what
level of pollution at what cost is socially desirable rather than obfuscate such issues
when the public is expected to focus on the minutiae of pollution licensing.35
Eco-taxes, along with other economic instruments, are not however without
potentially signiﬁcant limitations. Unlike quantitative pollution regulation (or
tradeable emission permits operating within a pollution cap), eco-taxes suffer from
the drawback that they have uncertain environmental effects. The level of pollution
reduction engendered ﬂows from companies’ responses to the ﬁnancial incentive of
the tax, and it is difﬁcult to model in advance what level of taxation is necessary
to provoke a particular environmental effect.36 Secondly, in large decentralised
companies with specialised branches, decisions made by responsible units regarding
desired pollution abatement or energy saving efforts in response to eco-taxes may
not be effectively imparted to all arms of the business. Large ﬁrms may also be
preoccupied with other priorities, causing them to disregard small environmental
taxes as just another business cost. Thirdly, eco-taxes and other economic
instruments usually require signiﬁcant re-regulation to ensure their proper
functioning and enforcement. Economic instruments do not necessarily mean costreducing market deregulation, and arrangements for monitoring and enforcing
economic instruments can be complex and expensive.37 Fourthly, in the absence of
international environmental tax harmonisation, eco-taxes levied on one country’s
industry may also damage that country competitively by making foreign imports
relatively cheaper if competitor countries have no similar taxes.38 Some existing
academic research however suggests that such fears may be exaggerated.39 Fifthly,

eco-taxes can collide with social policy concerns, primarily when the poor are
disproportionately affected because a larger share of their income is spent on taxed
items such as heating or lighting fuel.40 Compensatory payments can be made,
although this increases administrative complexity. And ﬁnally, arguments have
been made by Sagoff and others that using market-based policy mechanisms
wrongly bases environmental decisions on people’s ‘consumer’ preferences rather,
as they assert should be the case, people’s ‘citizen’ preferences given the political
and ethical issues at stake.41
On balance, there would appear to be a role for eco-taxes and other economic
instruments as a means of environmental policy, but that the justiﬁcation for using
eco-taxes depends on the speciﬁc environmental problem and the prevailing market
and institutional characteristics. Environmental policy-makers cannot rely on
economic instruments to make fundamental judgements about environmental
strategy: overall environmental quality objectives should be democratically
determined by government, such as sustainable CO2 loads in the atmosphere.42
Successful

applications

of

eco-taxes

hinge

on

careful

design

and

implementation—there is a considerable jump from theoretical principles to
effective practical applications. Problems may arise if tax structures are too
complex (hence costly to administer) or if tax incentives are insufﬁciently large to
spur changes in ﬁrms’ or individuals’ behaviour. The political feasibility of new ecotaxes must also be addressed at this stage.43 Eco-taxes are likely to be most valuable,
suggests Smith, ‘where wide-ranging changes in behaviour are needed across a
large number of production and consumption activities’.44 In such circumstances,
the alternative of direct source-by-source regulation would likely generate
unacceptable high costs. However, it is important to recognise that rarely is it a
dichotomous choice between economic instruments and command regulation.
Grabosky and Gunningham remind us that: ‘single instrument . . . approaches are
misguided . . . [and] that in the large majority of circumstances (though certainly not
all), a mix of instruments is required, tailored to speciﬁc policy goals’.45 Solutions to

climate change and sustainable energy use in particular entail numerous economic
sectors and actors, each of which needs a combination of policy instruments.

3. The Climate Change Levy
3.1 Development of the Levy and its Structure
In his March 1998 Budget, the Chancellor announced a review into the suitability of
a tax on the industrial and commercial use of energy.46 The resulting Lord Marshall
report recommended that both taxation and tradeable emission permits could assist
the UK to reduce its GHG emissions, but it favoured an early introduction of a
compulsory energy tax, coupled with a pilot tradeable emissions scheme pending
further investigation of this option until international trading formally began.47 Lord
Marshall favoured a tax based on energy consumption (excluding renewables) rather
than the carbon content of fuels, partly because of difﬁculties measuring the
equivalent CO2 content of electricity generated from various primary fuels.48
Marshall also cautioned that an energy tax should not be imposed on the domestic
sector (due to fuel poverty concerns) and that ‘any measures must be subject to
careful design in order to protect the competitiveness of British industry and
maximise their environmental beneﬁt’.49
Plans for the CCL, which were mooted in the Chancellor’s March 1999 Budget,50
generally followed the recommendations of Lord Marshall.51 The energy intensive
chemical and steel industries were among the most critical of the CCL proposal,52
predicting a disproportionate burden on manufacturing and adverse international
competitiveness effects.53 But many businesses consulted accepted a role for energy
taxation; the Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment favoured a
longterm policy framework within which UK businesses could deliver carbon savings
costeffectively without harm to business competitiveness.54 Following two years of
consultation,55 the Levy was adjusted with inclusion of some additional ﬁnancial
concessions, as outlined below, which appeared to be broadly acceptable to
industry.56 The structure of the Levy also proved to be acceptable to the European

Commission’s Competition Directorate.57
The CCL was introduced as a ‘downstream’ energy tax based primarily on
industrial use of energy rather than an ‘upstream’ carbon tax on energy suppliers.
Implemented through Schedule 6 of the Finance Act 2000 and collected by HM
Customs and Excise, the Levy applies to energy used by industry and the public
sector, but not to energy consumed in households, transportation or registered
charities. Also exempt are small businesses using limited amounts of energy
equivalent to ‘domestic use’. Further, horticulturist businesses, recognised by the
government as a ‘special case’ high-energy user, enjoy a 50% discount for up to
ﬁve years. Not all fuels are taxed; renewable energy (with the exception of large
scale hydropower greater than 10MW) is exempt so as to encourage businesses to
opt for non-fossil fuels. Suppliers of exempt renewable energies must hold a Levy
Exemption Certiﬁcate, issued by the Ofﬁce of the Gas and Electricity Markets. Also
exempt is approved combined heat and power (CHP), which is a recycled lowcarbon energy form, fuels used as a feedstock, and electricity harnessed in
electrolysis processes (e.g. in aluminium smelting). Electricity from nuclear power,
although not a fossil fuel, is subject to the CCL— arguably an appropriate
measure given that nuclear power poses its own environmental problems and to
exempt nuclear energy would have encouraged more investment in this sector at
the expense of the ﬂedgling renewables market. The CCL does not apply to oils
already subject to excise duties. The current CCL rates include 0.15 p/kWh for gas,
coal and coke, and 0.43 p/kWh for electricity, and the Levy is set to rise year-onyear, although no rise was made on its 2002 anniversary. The CCL is added to
energy consumers’ bills before VAT and has increased on average by 15% the
energy bills of businesses.
3.2 Levy Concessions
The CCL was advanced on a ﬁscally revenue neutral basis at a macroscopic level,
although not necessarily revenue neutral at the level of individual ﬁrms, through a
0.3% reduction in all employers’ national insurance contributions (NICs). Such a

ﬁnancial design reﬂects principles of ecological tax reform. The latter has been
deﬁned as ‘shifting taxation off the value-adding activities of people (employment,
enterprise and investment) onto the value-subtracting use of energy and resources
and associated creation of wastes and pollution’.58 It is an approach endorsed by the
UK’s Sustainable Development Strategy 1999,59 and the European Commission.60
The German government has gone the furthest in ecological tax reform:61 under the
1999 Law Initiating the Ecological Tax Reform, higher energy taxes were offset by
reductions in workers’ and employers’ social security contributions.62
The CCL’s ﬁnancial impact is further assuaged by the enhanced capital allowances
(ECAs) scheme, whereby investment in speciﬁc energy efﬁcient products (e.g.
pipework insulation and thermal screens) enables companies to reclaim 100% of
the capital allowance in the ﬁrst year. The ECAs are administered by the Carbon
Trust, established in April 2001 as an independent, non proﬁt-making company to
recycle some £150 million of CCL receipts over three years to quicken the
adoption of low carbon technologies.63 The Trust’s remit extends to provision of
advice and information, research and demonstration projects.
The main way energy intensive companies can manage their tax liability and
improve environmental performance is through participation in the Climate Change
Agreements (CC Agreements). An up to 80% discount from the Levy is available to
companies that pursue challenging targets for improving energy efﬁciency or
reducing carbon emissions through agreements negotiated between their relevant
sector trade associations and the Secretary of State. The scheme is restricted to
‘energy intensive’ industries, as deﬁned in Parts A1 and A2 of Schedule 1 of the
Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000.64 The
agreements operate until 31 March 2013. To date, umbrella agreements with 44
trade associations have been concluded, each association covering a plethora of
individual businesses and some 8,000 industrial sites in all. Participants include
the Brewers and Licensed Retailers Association; British Cement Association;

Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd; Food and Drink Federation; and
British Apparel and Textiles Confederation.65
The CC Agreements do not dictate how companies must achieve energy reduction
and efﬁciency performance targets; rather, they detail the goals and methods for
calculating performance, and reporting and veriﬁcation protocols.66 Each sector has
a target and a set of two-yearly milestones when performance is reviewed. Failure to
meet agreed targets results in the Levy rebates being suspended or withdrawn.
Parties that exceed their targets may trade their ‘credits’ with other businesses
through the CETS, and may purchase allowances if necessary to meet target
shortfalls. The Agreements are subject to ﬁve-yearly reviews and possible
adjustments as a result of each review.

4. Implementation of the Levy
Implementation of the CCL can be evaluated against a variety of criteria, and the
most important ones are economic impacts and environmental effects. On the
environmental criterion, DEFRA estimated that the CCL package (including the CC
Agreements) would save 5 MtCe (million tonnes of CO2 equivalent) per year by
2010.67 It appears CO2 emissions actually rose by 1.5% in 2001, supposedly due to
more coal usage in power stations in response to higher gas prices.68 The Energy
Minister, Brian Wilson, admitted in May 2002 that it appeared unlikely that Britain
would reach its stepping-stone target of 5% of electricity generated from renewables
by end of 2003.69 It is an altogether different but vital question, of course, whether
such emission reduction and renewable energy targets are sufﬁcient to avoid
dangerous climate change.
In terms of economic impacts—crucial to the political viability of the CCL—various
commentators and industry groups made dire forecasts of the Levy’s impact on the
private sector. A sensational report by Business Strategies (sponsored by steel,
chemical and engineering industry associations), predicted the CCL would
provoke 156,000 job losses over ten years, reduce UK manufacturing productivity

by 0.8% and generally weaken UK international trade competitiveness.70 Various
trade and industry periodicals carried similar alarmist predictions.71 As many UK
companies had already supposedly made great strides in improving their energy
and materials efﬁciency in order to stay in business, it was believed that the Levy
would bankrupt many such ﬁrms at the margins of solvency.72 A contrasting view
came from a study commissioned by the UK Worldwide Fund for Nature, which
found that industries employing 93% of the UK workforce would either beneﬁt
from the CCL package or incur only a very slight net cost.73 It also pointed out that
given recent falls in electricity prices, the CCL would merely restore such fuel prices
to their levels of ﬁve years ago.
Other studies highlighted possible regional and sector speciﬁc effects. The
construction industry, services sector and the public sector would be net winners as
they are relatively labour-intensive (thus beneﬁting from the NIC reductions) than
energy-intensive. The chemical, plastics and steel industries are among industry
sectors commentators predicted would be maligned by the CCL because of their
high-energy needs and low stafﬁng.74 However, such differences do not seem to
account for the fact that energy intensive industries are eligible to receive an
80% CCL rebate by participating in the CC Agreements. Apart from differential
economic sector effects, there are also possible geographical variations in the
impact of the CCL; Business Strategies predicted such regional disparities, with
northern British manufacturers to be disproportionately affected because of their
higher concentration of energy intensive companies.75
Recently, evidence is emerging of the actual effects of the Levy. SGS Consulting
surveyed 100 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in early 2002 on their reaction
to the CCL.76 It found that 25% of enterprises were unaware that the Levy had come
into force, and that almost a quarter of ﬁrms did not understand the Levy’s purpose
or how its revenue was spent. Half of SME manufacturers reported that they believed
the CCL would ultimately have a negative impact on their business against a quarter
of respondents who believed that the Levy would have a net positive ﬁnancial effect

due to the NIC reductions. The SGS study found that 27% of SMEs had implemented
a programme to monitor or manage their energy consumption, with installation of
energy efﬁcient lighting being the most popular method, although it was not clear
whether such energy management measures were in direct response to the CCL. SGS
Consulting suggested special measures were needed in the CCL package to directly
assist SMEs because their size reduced their access to the CC Agreements or to
Levy-exempt CHP fuels.77
A second, more detailed study, conducted by the Federation of Small Businesses78
found that 66% of SMEs were better off after the Levy due to the NIC reduction
whilst remaining under the CCL exemption threshold because of their low energy
usage.79 Of the 34% of SMEs subject to the Levy, FSB concluded that 88% were
ﬁnancially worse off, with the main ‘losers’ being SMEs involved in plastics processing,
hospitality and certain retailers.80 It gave as an example a plastic moulding company
employing 35 staff that was unable to participate in a CC Agreement and incurred
a net annual loss of £6,875 due to the CCL.81 The FSB study was critical of the
additional membership costs of participating in the CC Agreements.82 A third,
shorter survey, conducted by London Electricity of professionals working in the energy
industry, revealed that 42% of respondents felt the CCL had caused a net increase
in their business’s costs and 33% did not believe that the CCL had prompted new
energy management initiatives.83 Sixty per cent of respondents agreed that more
guidance was needed on how to obtain and utilise renewable energy.
Other insights into the Levy’s effects are coming from trade associations, industry
publications and academic commentators. Some instances of signiﬁcant energy
savings have been reported among engineering businesses in response to the
CCL.84 Studies suggest that most organisations can reduce their energy bills by up
to 10– 20% through low or no cost measures.85 This can substantially offset the
average 15% increase in the average industrial user’s annual electricity bill
caused by the Levy, without taking into account the effects of the NIC reductions
and Levy rebates. On the other hand, some companies appear to have

experienced lengthy delays (and costs) in joining the CC Agreements because of
insufﬁcient information on eligibility criteria provided by authorities.86

5. Survey of Northwest Businesses
From July–September 2002, Chanwai undertook an exploratory investigation and
conducted questionnaires delivered by site visits, telephone and email, of three
sample groups of businesses and organisations in the Northwest of England,
regarding their experience with the CCL and ancillary energy policies.87 This
region has a major share of the UK’s heavy industry and thus would be expected
to particularly affected by the CCL. The research was undertaken under the auspices
of Sustainability Northwest in Manchester, which helped with choice of the survey
samples and research logistics. The three samples were: an exploratory
investigation of twelve major businesses and organisations involving interviews; a
schedule list of questions delivered by telephone or site visit to six energy supply
companies in the region; and a wider questionnaire survey of forty companies and
organisations in the Northwest (the ‘wider population’), in order to assess whether
the key issues identiﬁed in the ﬁrst core sample group were consistent with those of
the larger business community. The ﬁrst sample group included a local council, an
airport operator, several heavy manufacturing and engineering companies,
ﬁnancial institutions, and several ﬁrms in the retail and service sector.88 The
questions covered inter alia respondents’ knowledge of the Levy; adoption of new
energy management practices; the effects of the NIC reductions; and desired
changes to the CCL regime. All respondents demonstrated some awareness of
the workings of the Levy, ranging from a ‘general awareness’ to an ‘in-depth
knowledge’. Eleven of the twelve respondents already had in place policies and/or
practices for energy efﬁciency and conservation prior to the Levy, including in
several cases involving ISO 14001 registration. However, of the eleven businesses,
four had not implemented additional energy management practices since the CCL
and of those that had, ﬁve were doing so only because they were participating

or applying to participate in a CC Agreement.
The research pointed to the importance of the CC Agreements process rather than
the Levy per se in driving efforts to control GHG emissions. However, a couple of
ﬁrms commented that they had found the CC Agreement process ‘complex and
costly’, due to obligations to identify, calculate and report emissions (e.g. energy per
unit per product), and concerns that expenditure on installing energy measuring
equipment might exceed the ﬁnal value of the CCL rebate. Energy management
practices adopted by these and other companies included designation of staff as
energy managers and new energy house-keeping programmes (e.g. low energy light
bulbs and voltage monitoring). Interestingly, only two companies had acted to source
more of their electricity from renewable energy sources, and the one business with
an existing CHP plant (CCL exempt) only operated it at half capacity because of its
high cost. Several companies reported that their large size impeded effective delivery
of new energy efﬁciency initiatives to dispersed ofﬁces and branches. An important
selling point of the Levy was the off-setting employers’ NIC reductions, but none of
the respondents disclosed any additional staff recruitment because of their lower
payroll taxes. In two cases, ﬁrms admitted difﬁculties detecting and measuring any
relationship between the ﬁnancial effects of the Levy and the NIC changes because
their energy budget and company payroll were managed by separate accounting
systems.
In terms of possible changes to the CCL regime, some respondents requested more
and clearer information from the government on how to reduce their Levy liability
through energy conservation actions. One company felt although there had been a
proliferation of energy advice schemes, the result had only been confusion not clarity.
Other respondents mentioned it would be preferable to receive up-front public grants
rather than tax-deduction capital allowances to spur new investment in clean energy
technologies. It was also mentioned that the ECAs should be amended to subsidise
the running costs of new energy efﬁcient investments. A couple of companies also
complained that the CCL scheme should be adjusted to recognise prior environmental

and energy performance improvements made by affected companies, although it was
unclear how this could be implemented.
The second sample surveyed six energy supply companies in terms of their reaction
to the Levy (although it does not directly apply to them), and barriers they may
have experienced to expanding CCL-exempt renewable energy generation. All the
respondents professed a strong interest in expanding renewable energy supplies,
although only two of the six cited increased consumer pressure for so doing. The
main reason was the effect of the Renewables Obligation (RO). The RO was
introduced through the Utilities Act 2000 (and took effect in 2002), obliging energy
supply companies to increase their provision of renewable energy supply to 10.4% of
total electricity supply by 2010.89 All the respondents reported two distinct barriers
to expanding their supply of renewables. These were connecting green fuel sources
to the national electricity grid and planning legislation restrictions to new energy
projects such as wind farms. In several cases, respondents reported intransigence or
hostility from local councils to renewable energy projects. Difﬁculties in obtaining
development consents under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 reported by
the respondents have also been cited in other studies.90 Regarding the electricity grid,
several energy companies cited problems associated with the connection costs for new
renewable energy supplies and, secondly, the difﬁculties of integrating small and
intermittent electricity supplies to the New Electricity Trading Arrangements
(NETA), introduced on 27 March 2001 as the framework for the wholesale electricity
market in England and Wales.91 Under NETA, electricity suppliers and generators
must contract directly with each other, and penalties are imposed where demand
exceeds contracted levels or generation falls short of it. Through these market
reforms, NETA sought to stimulate genuine competition into wholesale electricity
trading and provide price reductions for consumers. But for small energy generators,
whose supplies may be intermittent and less reliable, there is a danger of breaching
contracted supply levels and so incurring heavy ﬁnancial penalties.92 Due to the
current price reductions from the NETA deregulation gas and electricity wholesale

market, some respondents felt that certain renewable energy projects were not
economically feasible, even apart from planning law and grid connection concerns.
From the wider population of 40 business and organisations in the Northwest of
England sampled,93 the ﬁndings were broadly consistent with the trends from the
core group. Regarding companies’ knowledge of the workings of the CCL and how it
affected their operations, 85% of respondents indicated a general awareness of the
Levy, but were less knowledgeable of speciﬁc issues, such as who qualiﬁed as a ‘high
energy intensive’ user (30% of respondents) for the purpose of CC Agreement
participation. Regarding the effects of the NIC reduction, 55% of the
respondents reported no net ﬁnancial beneﬁt. This appeared to be due to the
characteristics of business’ operations and corporate structure, as well as reliance on
separate accounting systems that obfuscate the relationship between energy bills
and payroll taxes.
A high 82% of respondents from the wider population sample admitted to making
some energy management changes to their business operations before the Levy, and
55% making changes after the Levy. Of both sets of changes, low cost, non-invasive
measures were overwhelmingly favoured. Such a level of ‘voluntary’ action reﬂects
practice in other jurisdictions such as Australia where the country’s national
greenhouse challenge programme has focused on encouraging businesses to
adopt ‘no regrets measures’—i.e. those that can be done proﬁtably alone
regardless of any additional environmental justiﬁcation.94 Examples of measures
adopted in the UK sample included subscription to voluntary environmental
management systems (e.g. ISO 14001) and establishment of energy management
teams.
Changes made by respondents after the Levy showed a relative decrease in
implementation of positive pro-action measures. Public organisations (e.g. local
councils) showed a generally stronger commitment to invest in energy management
measures than companies. Thirty per cent of respondents reported making ‘no’
changes in response to the CCL, compared to the 17% who made ‘no’ changes

before the Levy. Of the companies and organisations making further energy
management changes in response to the CCL, an increasing proportion of these
changes were low cost rather than high cost measures. Some respondents
indicated that the existence of preexisting energy conservation measures made
additional changes superﬂuous (e.g. continuation of ISO 14001 accreditation).
Overall, this may infer that companies and organisations are currently restrained
by ﬁnancial resources from implementing seemingly expensive reforms or that
ﬁrms are currently focusing on picking the easy low hanging fruit (i.e. adopting ‘no
cost’ actions) and postponing the costly measures. In responding to the CCL, the
primary challenges reported by respondents related to time and labour resource
constraints. Some ﬁrms faced what were perceived as more pressing corporate
priorities, and in any event indicated (42% of respondents) difﬁculties in
disseminating new corporate energy policies and practices among their
decentralised ofﬁces and branches. Given the prevalence of subsidiaries and franchise
networks in modern corporate structures, it would seem that government
environmental reforms should be increasingly sensitive to the form of corporate
governance.95 Financial resources were also identiﬁed as a ‘challenge’ by 45% of
the respondents, especially in relation to small ﬁrms. Fifty per cent of respondents
stressed challenges related to inadequate media and government information on the
Levy and the problem of accessing affordable renewable energy sources. Another
challenge identiﬁed (40% of respondents) concerned the complexities of joining the
CC Agreements scheme—some saw it as too technical to facilitate wider interest.
A minority of respondents (17%) reported ‘no challenges’ in adapting to the Levy,
perhaps inferring that some companies are simply uninterested in reducing an extra
cost to their operations, or lack awareness of the connection between GHG emissions
and corporate proﬁtability. It also raises the fundamental question whether the CCL
rate is too low and that the price differential between green and brown fuel is
insufﬁcient to inﬂuence polluters. Ways to improve the CCL regime mentioned by the
wider population were consistent with the ﬁndings from the core sample. The

following section explores how the CCL might be redesigned in the light of this
and other research.

6. Reforming Energy Taxation
6.1 Redesigning the Climate Change Levy
The use of energy pricing mechanisms to address GHG emissions appears set to
remain an indelible feature of UK environmental regulation, and there are good
reasons that this should be so. Even critics of the CCL, such as the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI), have conceded that eco-taxes can when well designed produce
positive environmental and economic results.96 The problem, however, is that
environmental taxes do not always translate well into effective design. The UK
has little experience in environmental taxes, and there is little extensive
international experience to draw upon. The CCL should be seen as a somewhat
experimental initiative, with adjustments necessary over the coming years to
strengthen the ﬁnancial incentives. This was the case with the energy taxes
introduced in Scandinavia during the 1990s.97 The future of the CCL will also likely
be shaped by EU level developments. Although the Commission has long abandoned
plans for a carbon tax, it is continuing with a more pragmatic focus on energy
products taxes based on extending the existing system of excise duties and a
gradual increase in existing levels of taxation.98 Existing literature suggests that
properly designed eco-taxes can encourage polluting companies to reduce their
emissions and invest in cleaner technologies and fuels.99 Chanwai’s research suggests
that the effectiveness of incentive taxes depends partially on the existence of
parallel reforms such as market restructuring to improve the supply of renewable
energy fuels and provision of technical advice to companies interested in better
managing their

tax liabilities.

The

surveys

disclosed that

most energy

management changes adopted by companies occurred before the Levy was
introduced. The CCL experience suggests a much more mute, half-hearted and
haphazard response than theory predicts. Apart from the give-ways available through

the ECAs, evidence of companies ‘physically’ investing in cleaner machinery, as
predicted by economic theory, remains to be widely seen.
The economic literature also stresses the importance of eco-taxes reﬂecting
environmental externality costs (in this case global warming) if they are to have a
substantial inﬂuence on polluters’ behaviour.100 Unless there is a signiﬁcant
difference between the cost of brown and green energy, most industries are not
going to make necessary radical changes in their operations towards sustainable
energy systems. Quite simply, it must become more unproﬁtable to pollute and
indulge in proﬂigate energy consumption before widespread corporate changes can
be expected. There is considerable scope for the Levy to be increased (but with
corresponding NIC deductions or other concessions) given that over the past ﬁve
years liberalisation of energy markets has resulted in major price reductions for
British energy consumers. The academic literature also advocates ecological tax
reform as providing a more holistic approach for addressing the inter-relationships
between economic and environmental factors. The UK has made tentative steps
towards ecological tax reform, ﬁrst with the Landﬁll Tax and now with the CCL.
Chanwai’s research suggests that in relation to the Levy, the reform has been too
tentative and the NIC reductions have not imparted a sufﬁciently tangible signal to
companies to recruit extra staff whilst striving to reduce taxed energy use. A
contributing factor to the muted effect of the NIC reduction is that many
organisations reported maintaining separate payroll and energy cost accounting
systems, thus impeding recognition of the inter-relationships between the two. Also
relevant is that large, decentralised companies found it difﬁcult to measure such
ﬁnancial changes. This suggests that eco-tax reform may unravel where reformers
treat corporations as homogenous entities, and so fail to develop policies or
mechanisms to ensure that the message of ﬁnancial incentives can be effectively
disseminated

through

large

businesses.

Reforms

to

integrate

corporate

environmental and ﬁnancial reporting are one promising avenue by which the latter
two problems could be addressed.101

The opportunity for certain energy-intensive industries to obtain high CCL rebates
through participation in the CC Agreements also warrants review. Some industries
surveyed felt unjustly excluded from the Agreements. To qualify for the rebates, an
industry must be subject to the EU’s IPPC Directive as incorporated in the Pollution
Prevention and Control Act 1999. However, the IPPC regime was designed to control
industrial pollution and only indirectly addresses the energy intensity of industry. It
would appear that for primarily reasons of administrative convenience the
government chose to use IPPC coverage to deﬁne eligibility to participate in the CC
Agreements.
Another problematic feature of the CCL concerns the distribution of CCL revenues
recycled between NIC reductions and subsidies for energy efﬁciency investments.
Initially the government proposed a 0.5% NIC reduction coupled with a £50 fund to
support energy efﬁciency investments, but this was later altered to a 0.3% NIC
reduction and a £150 million fund in response to business lobbying. In 1999, the
House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee recommended doubling the
amount of direct funding for energy efﬁciency under the CCL.102 There appears to
be no substantive rationale for the basis of the current distribution, which should
be carefully reviewed.
Apart from these ‘ﬁne-tuning’ reforms, there are some very fundamental questions
about the structure and scope of the CCL that warrant addressing. The CCL is
essentially an industrial energy tax, rather than a carbon tax levied on the carbon
content of fuels. Chanwai’s research has revealed that energy suppliers’ motivations
to expand their supply of renewable energy has come mainly from the RO and not
consumer pressure from CCL-taxed businesses. The RCEP favoured the CCL being
in the form of an upstream (i.e. on energy suppliers) carbon-based tax to enable
GHG emissions at source to be directly addressed, and it dismissed as overstated the
administrative complexities of this option suggested by the Lord Marshall Report.103
The House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee was critical of the decision
of the government to favour an energy over a carbon tax, which it saw motivated by

a desire to protect the struggling coal industry which would be hurt most by a pure
carbon tax.104 There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each form of
tax and whether a tax should be upstream or downstream (i.e. on consumers). The
main argument for an energy tax on consumers over a carbon tax in that it should
better promote energy efﬁcient technologies. But an upstream carbon tax would
involve fewer taxable entities than an energy consumption tax, and therefore less
ﬁscal supervision and lower regulatory compliance costs.105 In an EU context, where
Member States trade in electricity, there could be an advantage in adopting a carbon
tax levied on reﬁned fuel products at the point of consumption as such fuel excises
make it easier to attribute tax revenues to the country of ﬁnal sale. Of the tax
schemes already adopted by European countries, none are pure carbon taxes.
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden’s taxes are assessed on the average carbon content
of fuels with lower rates or exemptions for speciﬁc fuels or economic sectors. In
Finland and the Netherlands, the tax is based on both carbon content and energy
content. More detailed research into the relative advantages of carbon and energy
taxation should be commissioned by UK authorities to assess better the arguments
and existing experience.
There is also the contentious question of how high a carbon or energy tax should be
pitched. The effectiveness of the CCL may have been undermined by signiﬁcant
declines of up to 40% in wholesale electricity prices since 1998.106 According to standard
economic theory, the ideal carbon tax should be priced to achieve the economically
optimal amount of GHG emissions at which the economic costs and beneﬁts of
reducing emissions by an extra tonne are equalised. But research also suggests there
are huge uncertainties involved in modelling carbon taxes.107 Moreover, as global
warming involves complex ethical issues and is plagued by considerable scientiﬁc
uncertainty, determining an optimal level of GHG emissions (and hence climate change)
for the purposes of eco-tax design is fraught with difﬁculty. Furthermore, research
on the price elasticises of demand for energy suggest that such elasticises are low,
implying that a very large energy tax is necessary to engender reductions in energy

use.108 Yet, some eco-taxes may achieve highly elastic polluter responses; for example,
the tax differential introduced between leaded and unleaded petrol in many countries
including the UK was followed by rapid fuel substitution.109 Furthermore, a politically
acceptable, small carbon tax could nonetheless change perceptions about the future,
inﬂuencing investment strategies that determine long-term GHG emission trends.
6.2 Emissions Trading and Taxing the Domestic and Transport Sectors
The question of the relationship between the CCL and the pilot emissions trading
scheme must also be eventually resolved. Should both operate concurrently, or should
the UK opt for a single economic instrument to promote sustainable energy use?
There is substantial economic literature devoted to arguing the relative merits of
taxation versus marketable permits to control pollution. The essential difference is
that whereas taxes set a ‘price’ on environmental use and rely on the market to
effect corresponding behavioural changes towards the desired environmental goal,
tradeable permits are based on government determining the environmental goal (in
the form of an emissions ‘cap’) and relying on the market to price and allocate the
tradeable entitlements.110 Whilst a tax instrument offers predictable costs (e.g. tax
per unit of fuel), the resulting environmental performance can be uncertain; for
example, the tax may be too low to encourage industries to reduce emissions.
Alternatively, trading within a cap offers certainty of emission levels (i.e. the total
number of tradeable pollution allowances equals the deemed sustainable pollution
load), but the resulting compliance costs will vary by ﬁrm depending on a business’s
efﬁciency. These arguments have been considered by governments in relation to
controlling GHG emissions, with some preference for a trading mechanism, partly
because it would allow environmental groups to participate and withhold
allowances.111
But a key weakness with tradeable permits is that they are not easily adapted to
situations involving numerous, small polluters, such as motor vehicles and
households.112 The market transaction costs are usually too high to integrate such
smaller polluters in a trading scheme, which is better suited to a market of a

few major, heavy polluters. Furthermore, a tax has the advantage that its
revenues can fund compensation for low-income families or businesses
vulnerable to higher energy prices and help ﬁnance development of low-emission
technologies. Therefore, a combination of energy taxation and tradeable emission
allowances may be most appropriate solution for the UK, with the CCL focusing on
smaller polluters and tradeable emissions permits allocated to heavy industry.
Such a scenario would entail a major overhaul of the CCL regime. Arguably a
major weakness with the CCL is the exemption to the polluting transport and
household sectors. Some of the respondents interviewed in Chanwai’s research
saw the CCL as unfair because of this exemption. The European Commission earlier
advised EU Member States that in responding to the Kyoto targets, governments
should introduce policy measures that tackled all sectors, especially transport and
households.113 Road transport dominates British emissions, although civil aircraft
and shipping contribute increasingly. Whilst the UK appears on course to meet its
Kyoto goal, this is only a modest start and does not reﬂect the very substantial
GHG emission cuts needed to avoid dangerous climate change. The Levy in its
current form will almost certainly not enable such long-term emission reductions. It
may need to extend to petroleum products and be substantially increased, with
CCL revenues from the private transport sector recycled into public transport
investments. The recent company car tax reform is a positive initiative and is
helping to encourage a switch to more fuel-efﬁcient vehicles.114 As public tolerance
of higher motoring charges is fragile, extending the CCL to private transport would
require hypothecating the additional Levy revenues speciﬁcally for public transport
improvements.
For the household sector, one challenge resides in building more energy efﬁcient
housing and renovating existing premises to incorporate heat and light saving
measures. The government has introduced a package of soft incentive and
regulatory measures in this area, but more work is needed.115 Households’ share
of UK ﬁnal energy consumption is 29%, second only to transport, and its

quantity of energy consumption has ballooned by more than 25% since the early
1970s because of population growth and changing housing patterns.116 The RCEP
has argued: ‘the government is mistaken in keeping domestic fuel cheap for all
households in order to help a minority of households who suffer from fuel poverty
. . . there should not . . . be a blanket exemption for households from taxation
measures aimed at limiting climate change’.117 The RCEP felt that the political and
social objections to such a move could be overcome by careful recycling of Levy
revenues to fuel poverty groups such as pensioners and the unemployed. Already,
in 1994, the UK government ended VAT zero-rating on domestic energy, but
eventually settled on a reduced VAT rate of 5%. Ultimately, the CCL has a future
role in Britain’s GHG emission control efforts, but perhaps a role different to that
envisaged by reformers. There is certainly scope to adjust technical features of the
CCL regime, as our research has revealed. But beyond this, more serious reforms
are needed. The role of emissions trading is one area. Extending the CCL to
motorists and households is another. The danger, however, is that short-term
political

considerations

will

displace

longer-term

strategic thinking.

The

government’s recent decision to bail out British Energy and talk of exempting
nuclear power from the CCL reﬂects the continuing substantial political obstacles
to effective environmental taxation reform in the UK.118
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